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Fineberg: The First Amendment and RICO: Limiting Prior Restraints

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RICO: LIMITING
PRIOR RESTRAINTS
Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993)
Justin Fineberg*
Petitioner, owner of several theaters and bookstores dealing in sexually,
explicit materials, was convicted in federal district court of selling and
transporting obscene materials' and of violating the Federal Racketeering
Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) statutes.' Thereafter, the court,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2),3 found that almost nine million dollars of property and inventory, including First Amendment protected books
and titles, was forfeitable to the government.4 The government subsequently destroyed the expressive materials.' On appeal, the petitioner
challenged the forfeiture claiming that it violated the First Amendment
protection against prior restraints.' The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision, reasoning that the forfeiture penalty, because it fol-

* Dedicated to the memory of my Great Grandmother Goldie Pearl (3G's), who taught me to
always strive for the best.
I. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2769-70 (1993). The district court convicted the
petitioner of 17 obscenity counts, consisting of 12 counts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1988) and
5 counts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1466 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Id. at 2769. The district court also
convicted the petitioner of various counts of tax evasion and related offenses which were not issues
before the Court. Id.
2. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769-70. The district court convicted the petitioner of three counts in
violation of RICO consisting of one count of receiving and using income derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988), one count of conducting a RICO
enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988), and one count of conspiring to conduct a RICO
enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988). Id.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (1988). The statute reads in pertinent part:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall ... forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law(2) any(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence
over;
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or
participated in the conduct of. in violation of section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
4. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770.
5. Id. at 2770 n.l. Regardless of whether the pornographic materials were legally obscene, the
government destroyed the forfeited materials instead of selling the materials to the public. Id.
6. Id. at 2770.
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lowed a racketeering conviction, was a valid subsequent punishment rather
than an impermissible prior restraint.' The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari,8 and HELD, that RICO forfeitures of otherwise protected First Amendment materials do not violate the petitioner's First
Amendment rights.9
Securing the liberty of expression, the First Amendment commands
that Congress shall pass no laws "abridging the freedom of speech or of
the press."'" In the First Amendment's earliest interpretations, the Supreme Court found that the First Amendment prohibits prior restraints."
A prior restraint on speech is an order forbidding certain communications
before the communications occur.' 2 The preferred traditional method for
regulating speech has been through subsequent punishment, that is, letting
the speaker take responsibility for the communication after it has been
spoken."3
The United States Supreme Court interpreted the scope of First
Amendment protection against prior restraints in Near v. Minnesota.4 In
Near, the Court confronted the broad issue of whether a state law violated
the essential attributes of free speech. 5 Pursuant to a state nuisance statute, the state sought to enjoin the defendant from publishing a
newspaper. 6 The state claimed that the newspaper, which criticized local

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2773.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment reads in pertinent part: "Congress
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " Id.
11. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697. 713-15 (1931). In addressing freedom of
Court explained: "[I]t is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints
tion." Id. at 713. This explanation seems consistent with the British common law
Blackstone:

shall make no
the press, the
upon publicadescribed by

"The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in
laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments
he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he
publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his
own temerity."

Id. at 713-14 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*151-52).

12. Ana M. Marin, Note. RICO's Forfeiture Provision: A First Amendment Restraint on Adult
Bookstores, 43 U. MtAMI L. REV. 419, 444 (1988); see also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97, 101 (1979) ("[Tlhis statute is not in the classic mold of prior restraint, there being no prior
injunction against publication.").
13. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 315-17 (1980); Bantam Books v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58. 70 (1963); Near, 283 U.S. at 714-15, 720.
14. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
15. Id.at 708.
16. Id. at 701-02. The applicable state statute which Chief Justice Hughes quoted in his opinion
for the Court states in pertinent part: " 'Any person who ... shall be engaged in the business of regularly or customarily ... publishing . . . a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine
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7
governmental officials, was "malicious, scandalous and defamatory."'
Overturning the defendant's conviction, the Court held that a permanent
injunction barring the defendant from publishing another defamatory newspaper acted as a prior restraint on free speech."
In Near, the Court recognized that freedom of speech and the press is
not absolute, and the state may punish its abuse through subsequent punishment.'9 However, before freedom of speech of the press can be regulated by statute, a court must test the statute's operation and effect to
determine whether it acts as a prior restraint..2 ' This test looks beyond the
statute's form to discover the statute's purpose, objective, and results.2
Because the statute in Near prevented future speech based on present
conduct, the Court held the statute unconstitutional.' Further, the Court
held that characterizing the*speech as a business causing a nuisance to the
community could not subvert protection against prior restraints.' In dicta,
the Court stated that there were several exceptions to the prior restraint
doctrine, possibly including the regulation of obscenity. However, the
Court did not discuss the scope of the government's power to use prior
restraints in regulating obscenity.'
The Court confronted the question of prior restraints on obscenity in
Bantam Books v. Sullivan." In Bantam, a Rhode Island statute created a
commission to review books and to advise book distributors which titles
were objectionable for sale to minors. Four publishers challenged the
statute's validity claiming the recommendations, which caused distributors
to return listed books, amounted to governmental censorship. As in

or other periodical, is guilty of a nuisance, and all persons guilty of such nuisance may be enjoined.'
Id. at 702.
17. Id. at 703.
18. Id. at 713-23. The Court found that even though the appellant could publish another newspaper, publishing itself would be seen as a contempt of the prior court order. Id. Because the appellant
would then be forced to justify his speech before it could be published, the Court deemed this a prior

restraint. Id.
19. Id. at 720.
20. Id. at 708.
21. Id. The Court held that a statute needs to be tested with regard to substance and not merely
to matters of form. Id.
22. Id. at 720. The Court stated, "If the publisher has a right, without previous restraint, to publish [magazines or newspapers], his right cannot be deemed to be dependent upon his publishing
something else, more or less. with the matter to which objection is made." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 716. These exceptions included statements made at wartime, such as sailing times of
transports or moving times of troops, statements inciting violence or revolution, and possibly obscene

statements. Id.
25. Id.
26. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
27. Id. at 59-60.
28. i. at 61.
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Near, the Court looked beyond the statute's form to its substance and held
that the commission's recommendations were tantamount to informal censorship and acted as an invalid prior restraint. 9
In Bantam, the Court reasoned that while obscenity may be regulated,3° only "a dim and uncertain line" separates it from protected
speech. 3 To guard against the wrongful suppression of protected speech,
courts must use " 'sensitive tools' " to distinguish protected speech from
obscenity.32 The Bantam Court held that even though the commission had
no legal authority, the procedures it used did not provide adequate protection for free speech.3" The danger of inadequate safeguards was manifested when the commission recommended booksellers remove some protected titles from sale.34 Because the Rhode Island statute operated as a
system of prior administrative restraints without proper safeguards, the
Court found the statute unconstitutional. 5
Several years after Bantam, Congress expanded federal obscenity
regulation by adding obscenity as a predicate offense to RICO.36 Congress enacted RICO to break the racketeering cycle by eliminating the
racketeer's economic base.37 Once a defendant is convicted of a RICO
violation, the statute mandates that the defendant forfeit all assets used in
the course of the prior racketeering activity to prevent similar future conduct.38 Congress found organized crime both contributed to and profited

29. Id. at 67. The Court stated, "We are not the first court to look through forms to the substance
and recognize that informal censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publications to warrant injunctive relief." Id.
30. Id. at 65 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1956)). In Roth, the Court held
that obscenity can be regulated because it has no redeeming social importance. Roth. 354 U.S. at 484.
31. Bantam, 372 U.S. at 66.
32. See id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)).
33. Id. at 70-71. The Court stated that a prior restraint system needed to operate under judicial
superintendence and with assurances of "an almost immediate judicial determination of the validity of
the restraint." Id. (citing Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957)).
34. See id. at 63-64. In addressing the effect of the Commission's recommendations, the Court
noted that the recommendations were
"clearly to intimidate the various book and magazine wholesale distributors and retailers
and to cause them, by reason of such intimidation and threat of prosecution. (a) to refuse to
take new orders for the proscribed publications, (b) to cease selling any of the copies on
hand, (c) to withdraw from retailers all unsold copies, and (d) to return all unsold copies to
the publishers."
Id. at 64.
35. Id.
36. See Alexander v. United States. 113 S. Ct. 2766. 2777 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Marn, supra note 12, at 424.
37. Alexander. 113 S. Ct. at 2777 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16, 26 (1983) (stating that Congress passed RICO "to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope
for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots").
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The statute provides that a person convicted
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"from an 'explosion in the volume and availability of pornography in our
society.' ""3 In response to these findings, Congress added obscenity as a
predicate offense.4"
The Supreme Court first interpreted obscenity convictions under RICO
in Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana." In Fort Wayne Books, the state, pursuant to a probable cause affidavit, asked the trial court for a pretrial order
to seize the petitioner's bookstore inventory.42 The petitione? 3 challenged the constitutionality of the state's request." As in Bantam, the
Court held that adequate safeguards were required before expressive materials could be regulated.45
In Fort Wayne Books, the Court distinguished obscenity regulations
from other RICO violations.46 The Court commented that while other
contraband may be seized on probable cause, a different standard applies
to expressive materials. As in Near, the Court ruled that it was of little
consequence how the state law characterized the speech. The relevant
inquiry considers whether the necessary protections against prior restraints
are available.4 9 The Court found that a prompt adversarial hearing is always necessary to justify seizing books or other publications presumed to
be protected by the First Amendment. 0 However, the Court never
reached the issue of whether the bookstore's entire contents, including
protected titles, would be forfeitable if the proper procedure was used."
In the instant case, the Court confronted the First Amendment implications of property forfeiture under federal RICO statutes.52 The majority,

under § 1962 shall forfeit to the United States "any interest the person has acquired or maintained in
violation of section 1962." Id. § 1963(a)(1). The term "interest" has been defined broadly to include
"all forms of real and personal property, including profits and proceeds." Russello, 464 U.S. at 21. For
a detailed discussion of the term interest, see id. at 20-24.
39. Andrew J. Melnick, Note, A "Peep" at RICO: Fort Wayne Books. Inc. v. Indiana and the
Application of Anti-Racketeering Statutes to Obscenity Violations. 69 B.U. L. REv. 389. 393 (1989)
(quoting 130 CONG. REC. 5433 (daily ed. Jan. 30. 1984) (statement of Sen. Helmes)).
40. Id.
41. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
42. Id. at 51.
43. Id. at 50, 53. Fort Wayne is actually a consolidation of two Indiana cases. Id. at 54. The
other case, No. 87-614, involved the same state RICO statute. Id. at 50, 53. In that case, the petitioner
raised several facial challenges to the statute, including that it was void for vagueness. Id. at 57-58.
The Court upheld the statute's validity and remanded the case to trial. Id. at 62, 68.
44. Id. at 52.
45. Id. at 67.
46. Id. at 66.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 67.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 66-67.
51. Id. at 65.
52. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

recognizing the First Amendment implications, compared the instant facts
to Near.3 However, the instant Court did not look to the statute's purpose and effect. 4 Rather, the Court embarked on a separate prior restraint
analysis and found the forfeiture provision valid. 5
The Court held the forfeiture did not act as a prior restraint because it
did not forbid speech activities. 6 Specifically, the forfeiture did not prevent the petitioner from selling adult books in the future, nor did it force
him to get prior approval before selling again. 7 It only prevented the
selling of tainted assets. 8 Further, the majority found the forfeiture acted
as a subsequent punishment because there were adequate safeguards, including a full judicial hearing, to determine whether the predicate materials were obscene. 9 Therefore, because the forfeiture resulted solely from
the petitioner's racketeering activity, it was neutral to the material's contents.'i The Court found there was a clear distinction between prior restraint and subsequent punishment, and held this to be a clear case of the
latter.6
Addressing the petitioner's contention that the statute's mandatory
forfeiture was so severe that it would have a chilling effect on the sale of
pornography, the majority found that laws deterring obscenity have typically included severe penalties.62 These penalties will force booksellers to
self-censor their inventories and ultimately limit public access to marginally protected materials.63 However, the Court held that this censorship is
justified because deterrence of the sale of obscene material is a legitimate
state goal.'

53. 1I. at 2771.
54. Id. at 2770-73. Instead of analyzing the statute's purpose and effect, the Court used a prior
restraint analysis to analyze the statute. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2771. The Court explained that temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions
are classic examples of prior restraints because they forbid certain communications before they occur.
Id. The Court explained that the forfeiture order did not impair the petitioner's ability to engage in any
communications. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Tainted assets are the assets which were related to racketeering activities. See id. The
Court stated the petitioner could re-enter the adult entertainment business if the petitioner acquired
enough untainted assets to open new stores. Id.
59. Id. at 2771-72.
60. Id. at 2771-73. The Court stated that the "RICO forfeiture order was not a prior restraint on
speech, but a punishment for past criminal conduct." Id. at 2772.
61. Id. at 2771-73.
62. Id. at 2774.
63. Id.; see also Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 50 ('" [A]ny form of criminal obscenity statute
applicable to a bookseller will induce some tendency to self-censorship and have some inhibitory
effect on the dissemination of material not obscene.' " (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147.
154-55 (1959))).
64. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774.
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In a strong dissent, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority's definition
of prior restraints.65 The dissent noted that the line dividing prior restraints and subsequent punishments can be clouded.66 Therefore, the dissent reasoned that the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent
punishments could not "sustain the destruction of a speech business and its
inventory as a punishment for past expression."'67 The dissent further argued that the majority erred in failing to look at the statute's operation and
effect. 8 This failure could lead to the evils of state censorship and unacceptable chilling effects on speech.69 Also, the dissent saw the possibility
of a censorial motive behind the regulation of unfavored speech.7" Thus,
to protect the public's confidence in the right to speak freely, the dissent
called for greater First Amendment protection for the forfeited material.71
The instant Court's decision effectively overrules the test enunciated in
Nea?2 and followed in Bantam.73 In those decisions, the Court held that
before speech could be regulated, a statute's operation and effect must be
analyzed.74 Unlike Near, however, the instant Court did not look beyond
the statute's operation.75 The Court found the seizure was a valid punishment for the obscenity offenses without analyzing the collateral implications.76 Consequently, the Court's holding relies more on the statute's
form than its substance.77
In reaching its decision, the Court narrowed the definition of prior
restraints.78 The Court found prior restraints were only orders forbidding
speech, such as temporary injunctions.79 However, this finding may oversimplify the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent punishments."0 As the dissent noted, some governmental actions resemble both

65. IL at 2776 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2779 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2782 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
69. Id. at 2783 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
70. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2784 (Kennedy. J.. dissenting).
72. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
74. Bantam, 372 U.S. at 67; Near, 283 U.S. at 708.
75. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2782 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2772-73.
77. Cf Near, 283 U.S. at 708 (holding that a court must look beyond a statute's language and
analyze its operation and effect).
78. See Alexander. 113 S. Ct. 2782-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Addressing the definition of
prior restraint, the dissent stated that "jilt is a flat misreading of our precedents to declare as the majority does that the definition of a prior restraint includes only those measures which impose a 'legal
impediment' on a speaker's ability to engage in future expressive activity." Id. at 2782 (Kennedy, .,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 2771.
80. Id. at 2779-82 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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prior restraints and subsequent punishments.8 Indeed, the explicit purpose of RICO's forfeiture provision is to act as both a prior restraint and a
subsequent punishment.' 2 The forfeiture seeks to prevent all future illegal
activity by seizing all assets related to the previous illegal activity. 3 Furthermore, once the materials are seized and destroyed, the store owner
cannot sell the speech elsewhere. 4 The tension between the majority and
dissent85 shows the difficulty of trying to distinguish between prior restraint and subsequent punishment.86
Moreover, in validating the RICO forfeiture, 7 the instant Court has
shifted the focus of First Amendment legislation. Previously, the Court
held that before expressive material can be regulated, the expressive materials must be judicially determined to be obscene using sensitive tools.8
However, RICO's forfeiture subverts this safeguard for protecting expressive materials by characterizing pornography as an interest, and the interest as forfeitable. 9 This technique was rejected in Near,' Bantam,"
and Fort Wayne Books.9 2 As a consequence, RICO has changed the emphasis of obscenity regulation, concentrating more on punishing First
Amendment abuses than on protecting First Amendment lawful expression.93 Under this decision, the government can confiscate books solely
because of their proximity on the shelf to nonprotected materials. 9'

81. Id. at 2780 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent gave a historical example of a subsequent
punishment which also acted as a prior restraint. Id. (Kennedy, J..
dissenting). A defendant, in punishment for printing a certain article which enraged the Queen. was condemned to lose his hand. Id.
(Kennedy, J.. dissenting). This punishment would both serve as a punitive measure against prior
speech, and also serve to prevent future speech. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
82. Id. at 2777 (Kennedy, J.,dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated, "A RICO conviction subjects
the violator not only to traditional, though stringent, criminal fines and prison terms, but also mandatory forfeiture under § 1963." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
84. See id. at 2779 (Kennedy, J.. dissenting).
85. See id. at 2776 (Kennedy, J.,dissenting) ("The Court's decision is a grave repudiation of
First Amendment principles ....
").
86. Id. at 2780 (Kennedy, J..
dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Kennedy argues that the distinctions may no longer be valid. Id. (Kennedy, J.. dissenting). Justice Kennedy further states that the
"distinction is neither so rigid nor so precise that it can bear the weight the Court places upon it." Id.
at 2779 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
87. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2770.
88. Bantaim, 372 U.S. at 66.
89. See Alexander 113 S.Ct. at 2783-84 (Kennedy, J..
dissenting).
90. Near.283 U.S. at 720.
91. Bantam, 372 U.S. at 66.
92. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 66.
93. Alexander. 113 S. Ct. at 2783-84 (Kennedy. J.,dissenting). The dissent stated that RICO
statutes
" 'arm prosecutors not with scalpels to excise obscene portions of an adult bookstore's inventory but with sickles to mow down the entire undesired use.' " Id. at 2784 (Kennedy, J.,dissenting)
(quoting Fort Waylne Books, 489 U.S. at 85 (Stevens. J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
94. See id. at 2783-84 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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Furthermore, in the absence of procedural safeguards, this new standard for regulating speech can be seen as criminalizing the-adult entertainment industry. 95 Self-censoring of inventories may not be enough to protect bookstore owners. 6 Once convicted of a RICO violation, the state is
now empowered to eliminate an entire unfavorable speech related
business.97 As Justice Kennedy's dissent notes, this forfeiture can serve
dual purposes.98 On the one hand, the forfeiture will eliminate the organized crime taint from the enterprise. 99 Furthermore, the forfeiture advances the government's interest in deterring the speech related business
itself."° Justice Kennedy further notes that the destruction of expressive
materials, without a judicial determination of their obscenity, bears a censorial cast.'' Consequently, the government
needs to take extra precau02
tions to insure that a forfeiture is valid.
Thus, the instant case affects free speech beyond the realm of obscenity. The Court's decision grants prosecutors an extensive weapon to regulate the entire pornographic industry. 3 By removing the procedural safeguards, the Court greatly restricted pornography's First Amendment
protection.'" Without looking to a statute's purpose and effect, the Court
gives great deference to Congress.0 5 While clearly a blow to adult bookstore owners, the warning should be sounded to all publishers of free
expression. Today, the Court sanctions the indirect regulation of any
speech which the legislature finds unfavorable.

95. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
96. See id. (Kennedy, J.. dissenting).
97. See id. at 2784 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 85 (Stevens, J..
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens argued that sexually explicit books are commodities the state wants to exterminate. Id. (Stevens, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Consequently, the "'RICO... scheme promotes such extermination through elimination of the very
establishments where sexually explicit speech is disseminated." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
98. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2784 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that "the
punishment serves not only the government's interest in purging organized-crime taint, but also its
interest in deterring the activities of the speech-related business itself." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing states'
interest in eliminating sexually explicit books).
101. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2784 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
102. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
103. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
M04.See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2776 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
105. See generally id. at 2777 (Kennedy, J.. dissenting) (discussing congressional intent in passing
RICO); Melnick, supra note 39, at 392-96.
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